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Previous research shows that, when it comes to foreign policy, individuals have general orientations that inform their
beliefs toward more specific issues in international relations. But such studies evade an even more important question:
what gives rise to such foreign-policy orientations in the first place? Combining an original survey on a nationally represen-
tative sample of Americans with Schwartz’s theory of values from political psychology, we show that people take foreign pol-
icy personally: the same basic values that people use to guide choices in their daily lives also travel to the domain of foreign
affairs. Conservation values are most strongly linked to “militant internationalism,” a general hawkishness in international
relations. The value of universalism is the most important value for predicting “cooperative internationalism,” the foreign-
policy orientation marked by a preference for multilateralism and cosmopolitanism in international affairs. This relatively
parsimonious and elegant system of values and foreign-policy beliefs is consistent across both high- and low-knowledge
respondents, offering one potential explanation for why those people who are otherwise uninformed about world politics
nonetheless express coherent foreign-policy beliefs.
A large body of scholarship holds that values not only play
a role in the mass public’s attitudes toward domestic
politics, but that they also help people make sense of atti-
tudes toward international affairs. In particular, existing
research finds that ordinary Americans have orientations
that inform their attitudes toward more specific issues in
international relations (Hurwitz and Peffley 1987;
Herrmann et al. 1999). Scholars generally agree that these
orientations originate in underlying values. Hurwitz and
Peffley (1987, 1105) and Rathbun (2007, 379) write of
“core values;” Herrmann et al. (1999, 553) assert a role
for “core dispositional values;” and Chittick et al. (1995,
314) stress the importance of “value orientations.” Against
the venerable Almond-Lippmann view that sees foreign-
policy beliefs as shapeless and incoherent (e.g., Almond
1950; Lippmann 1955), we now know that foreign policy
attitudes have structure and that values supply the mortar
that holds them together.
Despite this progress, however, international-relations
scholars lack a systematic understanding of, first, which
values matter and, second, how they contribute to the
architecture of foreign-policy views. In one strand of
literature, scholars infer values indirectly from the pat-
terns of association among specific foreign-policy attitudes
(Chittick et al. 1995). However, the lack of serious attempt
to measure values directly and to estimate their impact on for-
eign-policy postures limits the utility of this work. Another
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vein of scholarship avoids these pitfalls but assumes that
the more abstract values that drive the formation of for-
eign-policy preferences on specific issues are unique to
the foreign-policy domain. That is, it treats these values as
structuring only views on international affairs and not
other aspects of individuals’ social interactions. This
seems implausible (Hurwitz and Peffley 1987).
We hypothesize that foreign-policy dispositions derive
from values that structure not only political life but social
life in general. A number of social psychologists identify
models of values based on two universal human needs.
These needs often conflict with one another. On the one
hand, societies need to provide physical safety to their
members: to protect their group from internal and exter-
nal threats. On the other, societies also need to foster con-
sideration for others and reciprocal exchange so as to
reap the gains of cooperation—even with others outside
the group. Values serve both of these needs. We utilize
the Schwartz (1992) value framework. Not only does it
seem most capable of subsuming other similar models,
but it is also the most prominent model found in the re-
cent literature. According to it, the “conservation” values
of conformity, tradition, and security work to create the
solidarity and cohesion necessary to guard against internal
and external threats. “Self-transcendence” values foster
prosocial bonds between individuals—leading them not
only to care about, but also cooperate with, others.
We find evidence of a relatively parsimonious and ele-
gant system of values and foreign-policy beliefs in which dif-
ferent clusters of Schwartz values predict the core
components of foreign policy orientations. Conservation
values are most strongly linked to “militant international-
ism,” a general hawkishness in international relations.
Universalism—a self-transcendence value that indicates an
identification and concern for all human beings—is the
most important value for predicting “cooperative interna-
tionalism,” the foreign-policy orientation marked by cosmo-
politanism and multilateralism. The values that matter for
foreign-policy beliefs, in other words, are not just specific
to the domain of international affairs. They are bigger than
politics. Individuals take foreign policy personally.
Our integration of Schwartz into the study of foreign-
policy views makes two important contributions to existing
scholarship. First, unlike much of the existing research in
social psychology that focuses on one-off relationships be-
tween particular values and foreign policy preferences, we
study the role of values as part of a broader system. As
Kertzer et al. (2014, 828) argue, political scientists are
“confronted with a cornucopia of values to choose from.”
This raises questions about why we should study one par-
ticular value but not another; the Schwartz value frame-
work provides us with a unified and coherent framework.
Second, we measure values directly, ex ante, rather than di-
vining them ex post from the patterns of covariation found
among foreign policy attitudes.
This article calls into serious question pessimistic read-
ings of the mass public’s ability to form political judg-
ments without the help of elite cue-givers (e.g., Zaller
1992; Lupia and McCubbins 2000; Berinsky 2009).
Previous research shows how foreign-policy predisposi-
tions allow individuals to derive attitudes on specific for-
eign-policy events or questions on which they lack good
information (Rathbun 2007; Reifler et al. 2011; Kertzer
and McGraw 2012). We demonstrate that those disposi-
tions are themselves grounded in even more fundamental
values. Converse (1964) was correct in arguing that many
Americans are “innocent of ideology,” but we show how
these low-knowledge individuals prove just as able to con-
nect their personal values to foreign policy preferences as
their high-knowledge counterparts, despite the latter be-
ing more ideological than the former.
In the following sections, we first review the literature
on core values in foreign policy. We highlight the two
most important approaches: the cooperative/militant in-
ternationalism framework and the vertical hierarchy
model. We then introduce the Schwartz value framework,
derive hypotheses, and present results. Subsequently we
discuss the implications of those results for prominent tra-
ditions in foreign-policy opinion studies.
Values and Foreign Policy: Two Research Strands
Cooperative and Militant Internationalism
Two strands of research on the foreign policy attitudes of
the mass public stress the importance of values. Perhaps
the most prominent tradition in this research on foreign-
policy beliefs—offered by Wittkopf (1986, 1990, 1994) and
Holsti and Rosenau (1986, 1988, 1990, 1996)—consistently
finds that American foreign policy attitudes organize along
two related, but distinct, dimensions: cooperative and mili-
tant internationalism. Cooperative internationalism de-
scribes the extent to which one embraces the world with
open arms, militant internationalism captures beliefs about
willingness to meet the world with a clenched fist.
Cooperative internationalism is an orientation toward in-
ternational affairs that stresses concern for others abroad,
with whom one should work toward common goals.
Chittick et al. (1995) discuss cooperative internationalism
as a dimension capturing distinctions between self and
other in international affairs. They write, “What all these
[cooperative internationalism] questions seem to have in
common is a concern for the wider community. We believe
that those who emphasize the importance of these goals
have a more inclusive identity than those who de-empha-
size these same goals” (1995, 318). Similarly, Nincic and
Ramos (2010) write of “other-regarding” objectives, while
Rathbun (2007, 338) defines this dimension as denoting a
“sense of obligation to the broader international commu-
nity.” Global solidarity constitutes a key element of cooper-
ative internationalism, but cosmopolitanism concerns more
than just self-sacrifice and service to others: cooperative in-
ternationalists also believe that cooperation leads to mutual
gains. Accordingly, previous work finds that support for in-
ternational institutions, multilateralism, and international
collaboration all load on the same cooperative internation-
alism dimension (Rathbun 2007; Wittkopf 1990; Holsti and
Rosenau 1988, 1990).
Militant internationalism, on the other hand, generally
marks the familiar division between hawks and doves over
the importance, effectiveness, and desirability of using
force to reach foreign-policy objectives. Hurwitz and
Peffley posit a “dimension of militarism . . . anchored, on
the one end, by a desire that the government assume an
assertive, militant foreign-policy posture through military
strength and on the other by a desire for a more flexible
and accommodating stance through negotiations” (1987,
1107). According to some, hawkish and dovish postures
rest on different cognitive “models” about the effective-
ness of force (Jervis 1976; Tetlock 1983). Hawks embrace
the “deterrence model,” in which strength and the dem-
onstration of resolve best achieves peace. In this world-
view, lack of credibility and signs of weakness invite
challenges by aggressive foes in a dangerous environment.
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Doves, in contrast, point out the often self-defeating na-
ture of such displays, which risk inciting fear on the other
side and escalating hostilities in such a way that leaves
both sides worse off.
Scholars utilizing the cooperative internationalism/
militant internationalism framework sometimes also spec-
ify a third isolationist dimension in the structure of for-
eign-policy beliefs. This dimension involves a general
support for the United States turning inwards and with-
drawing from international affairs (Chittick et al. 1995;
Rathbun 2007). An isolationist disapproves of both for-
eign military engagements and collaborative multilateral
efforts to solve global problems. The cooperative/militant
internationalism framework was originally developed to
distinguish between two kinds of internationalists, each of
which opposed isolationism. Early public-opinion research
on foreign-policy attitudes tended to assume a single isola-
tionist-internationalist dimension (Holsti 1979). However,
isolationism stands apart from both cooperative and mili-
tant internationalism as a general belief that the United
States should avoid political entanglements with other
countries (Kertzer 2013). This difference receives support
in the frequent detection of a third independent dimen-
sion in factor analysis. It involves more than just a low
score on cooperative and militant internationalism, but in-
stead represents a phenomenon in its own right (Rathbun
2008, 395). While historically-oriented scholars demon-
strate that much of what observers construed as isolation-
ism in 20th-century American foreign policy actually
amounted to nationalist unilateralism (Dueck 2006;
Rathbun 2012)—which public-opinion scholars now call
militant internationalism—isolationism still remains a dis-
cernible, albeit small, force in American foreign policy.
Analysts in this tradition generally assume that these
foreign policy orientations are grounded in underlying
values. But they never measure them directly. Instead,
they surmise them from the clustering in factor analyses.
Murray and Cowden (1999, 458), for instance, write of the
“hidden organizing principles” that bring order and co-
herence to foreign policy belief systems. They are treated
as latent values that explain the pattern of factor loadings.
We argue that, instead, we should measure values directly
in order to better understand their nature. While the
general structure of foreign-policy beliefs remains well-
established, existing studies remain ambiguous as to what
underlies these postures.
Vertical Constraint Models
Another related strand of research places values at the top
of a hierarchical structure of attitudes. They inform for-
eign-policy orientations—such as constructs similar to co-
operative and militant internationalism—which in turn
manifest themselves in specific foreign-policy preferences
such as those concerning defense spending or coopera-
tion with the United Nations. Hurwitz and Peffley (1987,
1105) identify two primary values at the top of the chain:
“ethnocentrism” (essentially patriotism or nationalism)
and beliefs about the morality of force.
Although these models represent an important contri-
bution to our study of foreign-policy beliefs, the past sev-
eral decades of research on value systems in social and
political psychology suggest three related concerns. First,
the reason why values are so analytically powerful is be-
cause they are trans-situational, working across domains
(Jacoby 2006). In this sense, what we believe matters in
our personal lives should influence our judgments in
domains like foreign affairs as well. Yet classic hierarchical
models argue instead for a silo-like understanding of polit-
ical beliefs in which each domain has its own set of over-
arching principles from which everything else follows.
They thus imply that our personal values are separate
from our foreign-policy values (Hurwitz and Peffley 1987).
Second, and relatedly, because these models are do-
main-specific, they use values that are not very distant
from the specific foreign-policy attitudes they are trying to
explain. This choice leaves open the question of whether
less proximate values may also shape opinions on interna-
tional affairs. For instance, Hurwitz and Peffley (1987) ar-
gue that militarism, defined by preferring force over
diplomacy, is a function of beliefs about the morality of
warfare. Is the latter any more fundamental than the for-
mer? To truly examine how values affect foreign policy
thinking, we need measures of values uncontaminated by
the substance of foreign affairs. Grounding specific for-
eign-policy beliefs in more general personal values also
makes it easier to distinguish cause from effect, a common
complaint about the public opinion literature in foreign
policy (e.g. Fordham and Kleinberg 2012).
Finally, the choice of core foreign-policy values in the
vertical constraint literature comes across as somewhat ad
hoc: beliefs about the righteousness of using force un-
doubtedly matter, but preferences about multilateral co-
operation might be just as fundamental; how do we
decide ex ante what counts as a value worth studying?
Research that focuses on a handful of values in a given
study necessarily elides broader questions about the uni-
verse of values, as well as where these stand in relation to
one another. Insofar as value systems — as opposed to
one or two values — matter for public opinion, this omis-
sion proves problematic. Feldman (2003, 480) puts it this
way: “The piecemeal approach to values . . . leaves open
the possibility that important effects of values on political
attitudes are missed. Perhaps most important, an under-
standing of the overall structure of values and value sys-
tems may yield new insights into the nature of attitudinal
structure.”
Schwartz’s Theory of Values
We believe it is possible to improve on both strands of re-
search on the structure of foreign-policy beliefs by using a
more theoretically grounded model of values that explains
decision-making across multiple policy domains. We inte-
grate the insights of both these approaches while making
improvements. Like the proponents of the vertical con-
straint model, we measure values directly and hypothesize
how these more abstract principles might vertically struc-
ture more specific foreign policy postures: the orienta-
tions of cooperative internationalism, militant
internationalism, and isolationism derived from other
work. However, rather than taking an ad hoc approach to
the study of values, we follow a more systematic approach
made possible by Shalom Schwartz’s universal model of
values (1992, 1994) that tests whether values unspecific to
foreign policy nevertheless influence foreign policy
postures.
Building on the work of Rokeach (1973), Schwartz
(1994, 20) conceptualizes personal values as i) abstract be-
liefs ii) about desirable end states or behaviors that
iii) transcend specific circumstances and contexts, iv)
guide evaluation and behavior, and v) can be rank-or-
dered in terms of relative importance. Schwartz identifies
10 broad value domains: benevolence, universalism,
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self-direction, stimulation, hedonism, achievement,
power, security, conformity, and tradition. The content
and structure of personal values can be illustrated using
the circumplex shown in Figure 1, which arrays the value
types along a circular motivational continuum. Adjacent
values share similar motivations (and should be positively
correlated with one another); opposed values share con-
flicting motivations (and should be weakly or negatively
correlated with one another). Values should have the
highest positive correlations with those directly next to
them in the circumplex, so that, for instance, achievement
and power have a stronger positive association than
achievement and security.
When the motivational bases underpinning the identified
universe of personal values are considered en masse, four su-
perordinate values emerge. As indicated in Figure 1, the
capstone principles are (1) self-transcendence values, which
emphasize the acceptance of and concern for other individ-
uals (known and unknown), groups, society writ large, and
even the global community; (2) self-enhancement values,
which call for the pursuit of one’s own self-interest, success,
satisfaction and dominance, over others if necessary; (3)
openness values, which privilege independent feeling,
thought, creativity, and action; and (4) conservation values,
which emphasize self-restraint, social stability, resistance to
change, and deference to established traditions and cultural
dictates.
To illustrate, tradition values call for deference to estab-
lished familial, cultural, and religious norms and practices.
They are compatible with adjacent conformity values that
prioritize the goals of impulse control, self-restraint, and
submission to social expectations. Together as conservation
values they stand opposed to stimulation values, which pri-
oritize excitement and novelty, and self-direction values,
which emphasize thought and action free of socially im-
posed norms or internally imposed restraints. Hence, the
realization of one value (e.g. self-direction) can obstruct at-
tainment of another (e.g. tradition or conformity).
Over the past 25 years, Schwartz and others working in
this vein have collected data from over 400 independent
samples covering some 80 countries. Generally speaking,
the model performs quite well in most applications.
Researchers find the empirical patterns in the data usually
correspond to the hypothesized value structure (Schwartz
1992; Spini 2003; Davidov et al. 2008). Given the number
of independent samples and the fact that they are drawn
from diverse cultures, linguistic traditions, age groupings,
probability and non-probability samples, and different
points in time, it seems fair to conclude this model of
value content and structures rests on a strong empirical
foundation. As a result, the Schwartz value framework has
become “the most widely employed model of values” in so-
cial psychology (Hitlin and Pinkston 2013, 322), and “the
standard model in values research” (Gollan and Witte
2014, 452). At the time of this writing, the five most popu-
lar pieces by Schwartz developing this framework have
been cited over 21,000 times. Thus, although the Schwartz
value framework is by no means the only value framework
within social psychology, it is among the most widely em-
ployed, and as Duckitt and Sibley (2009, 100) note, there
is a striking similarity between Schwartz’s factors and
those utilized by others, which enables us to better de-
velop hypotheses about the connection between core val-
ues and foreign policy orientations.
Schwartz Values and Politics
Psychologists see personal values as standards that guide
perception, judgment, and behavior in all walks of life.
Values operate at a higher level of evaluative abstraction
than attitudes toward or beliefs about concrete objects;
therefore, the former are well-positioned to shape the lat-
ter. To take some examples, values shape lifestyle choices,
consumption decisions, altruistic behavior, social interac-
tions, college majors, what people worry about, and many
other judgments and behaviors (Bardi and Schwartz 2003;
Roccas et al. 2002; Verplanken and Holland 2002). It is
precisely because of values’ centrality in political judg-
ment that elites turn to value frames when they want to
mobilize public opinion (Zaller 1992; Nelson et al. 1997;
Brewer 2001).
Since people use values in a trans-situational manner to
guide evaluation in all (or at least many) elements of their
lives, the application of values to the formation of political
preferences follows naturally. Indeed, Converse (1964,
211) anticipated this possibility when he noted “a few
crowning postures—like premises about survival of the fit-
test in the spirit of social Darwinism—serve as a sort of
glue to bind together many more specific attitudes and
beliefs.” Recent research has found that basic human val-
ues shape public opinion on domestic policy views and
electoral choice in both the United States and in other
countries (e.g. Caprara et al. 2006; Piurko et al. 2011;
Schwartz et al. 2010). Conservation values of security, con-
formity, and tradition tend to predict support for the po-
litical right, and self-transcendence for the political left,
for instance.
Application of the Schwartz framework to the foreign
policy domain, however, has been much less systematic.
No study to date applies the Schwartz value framework sys-
tematically to foreign policy, focusing instead on how indi-
vidual values affect specific policy stances, such as the use
of force in a particular instance, or at best how values af-
fect one particular orientation, such as militarism (which
might be considered synonymous with militant interna-
tionalism). We know for instance that self-transcendence
values are important for understanding concern about hu-
man rights (McFarland and Matthews 2005). However, we
do not know whether Schwartz values affect the broader
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Figure 1. The Schwartz model of value relations
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construct of cooperative internationalism, which encom-
passes concern for the human rights of those abroad,
much less isolationism. In addition, most studies in this
tradition do not rely on representative samples, although
some do go beyond the undergraduate student body
(Mayton et al. 1999; Cohrs et al. 2005; Cohrs et al. 2005;
Schwartz et al. 2010; Bayram 2015).
Theoretical Expectations
Schwartz (1992, 1994) argues that values enable the
smooth functioning and survival of groups and coordi-
nated social interaction. Understanding values in this way
helps us identify their likely effects on foreign policy dis-
positions. We also buttress those proposed links with find-
ings from other value frameworks, most of which overlap
significantly with that of Schwartz.
Conservation values serve to create in-group solidarity
to protect from internal and external threats. In order to
provide for their safety, individuals must trade some de-
gree of autonomy (Feldman 2003). Jost et al. (2003, 339)
argue that an “existential” motivation underlies this set of
values. Braithwaite (1997, 401, 1998, 575) calls it the “se-
curity” dimension of social beliefs, attitudes, and values.
As Schwartz notes, both conformity and tradition entail
subordination of the self in favor of socially imposed ex-
pectations. They create social solidarity, making sure ev-
eryone is behaving properly and willing to sacrifice for the
group. Tradition and security both stress preserving exist-
ing social arrangements that give certainty to life, and con-
formity and security emphasize production of order and
harmony in social relations. Those who score high on
these values also embrace particular moral foundations of
in-group loyalty and deference to authority that serve the
common goal of “binding” the group together (Graham
et al. 2009, 1029; Graham et al. 2011, 366). Authority is
necessary for keeping individuals in line and for leading a
cohesive group against internal and external threats.
Duckitt (2001, 2006) and others (Duckitt et al. 2002; Van
Leeuwen and Park 2009) demonstrate that those that em-
brace these values are driven by a conception of the world
as a dangerous and threatening place. Feldman and
Stenner (1997) similarly show that they go hand-in-hand
with a sense of threat. Conservation values are marked by
an “avoidance” motivation; they seek to prevent negative
outcomes through protection and security rather than en-
sure positive ones through the provision of goods to
others (even if avoiding negative happenings requires the
provision of defense) (Janoff-Bulman et al. 2007, 1091;
Janoff-Bulman 2009, 120). Threats, of course, might be ei-
ther external or internal.
We expect that these conservation values will have the
greatest effect on support for militant internationalism, as
the military and force are used to protect the in-group from
threats. For those who hold conservation values, the use or
threat of force would be a necessary element for controlling
an unpredictable environment where there is no recourse to
a higher authority. Thus, they will be relatively more hawk-
ish. Conservation values might also lead to lower scores on
cooperative internationalism. Conservation values bind indi-
viduals together in the presence of some external “other,”
which could inhibit a sense of global identity and cosmopoli-
tanism. However, studies show that in-group identification
and out-group derogation are related but not reducible to
one another. For instance, greater patriotism does not neces-
sarily lead to nationalistic feelings of group superiority
(Kosterman and Feshbach 1989; Herrmann et al. 2009).
Of course, we recognize that conservation values also
vary by the situational context. The motivational goals
underlining right-wing authoritarianism (RWA) – concern
for conformity, tradition, and security – rise in situations
of acute threat (Duckitt 2001; Cohrs et al. 2005; Duckitt
and Fisher 2003). Although it goes beyond the scope of
our cross-sectional data, we know from foreign policy prac-
tice that there are often calls for greater conformity and
tradition when international threats become more acute
as a way of making society more cohesive and better able
to face an external challenge.
Self-transcendence values indicate concern for and ac-
ceptance of others. They are the expression of one of the
defining characteristics of human society, its high degree
of altruism, which facilitates cooperation and allows for a
higher degree of social organization (Cosmides 1989). Self-
transcendence values are associated with different moral
foundations than conservation values, those of fairness and
caring for others (Graham et al. 2009; Graham et al. 2011).
Braithwaite (1997, 1998) calls this the “harmony” dimen-
sion of values, oriented toward improving the welfare of
other individuals. Janoff-Bulman et al. (2007, 1091) identify
these values as having an “approach” motivation. They
drive individuals toward bringing about positive outcomes,
“providing” for others rather than “protecting” them.
Schwartz (1994, 22) distinguishes between benevolence,
which is caring for those in one’s local community, and
universalism, marked by “understanding, appreciation, tol-
erance, and protection for the welfare of all people and for
nature.” Universalism should be associated with a belief in
the interdependent nature of international relations and a
commitment to the collective resolution of common prob-
lems, what we might call multilateralism. Bayram (2015)
finds that self-transcendence values like universalism are
predictive of cosmopolitanism. Universalism will also po-
tentially lead to negative support for militant international-
ism, as the imposition of force is harmful to its targets and
universalists will demonstrate a greater concern for their
welfare, even if they are not part of one’s immediate in-
group. Nevertheless we expect that the primary effect of
universalism will be on cooperative internationalism.
Benevolence on the other hand will likely lead in the op-
posite direction. Conservation values call for in-group soli-
darity; for this reason benevolence sits adjacent to the
conservation set of values in the Schwartz circumplex that
encourage deference to authority and conformity to com-
mon social standards. Those high on benevolence are
therefore likely to score higher on militant international-
ism and lower on cooperative internationalism for the
same reasons as those who are high on conservation values.
To the extent that self-enhancement values — one’s
concern for one’s own achievement and power — are di-
rectly opposed to self-transcendence, particularly univer-
salism, we should expect that they predict support for
militant internationalism but are antagonistic to coopera-
tive internationalism. However, the relationship between
what one values for oneself and how one relates to
broader groupings is an open (and ultimately empirical)
question. It might be, for instance, that one’s desire for
personal achievement does not come at the expense of
one’s commitment to others. Indeed one might desire
power and achievement for oneself in order to help those
in one’s community and beyond. Since foreign policy is
fundamentally about groups interacting with one another,
it could be that the personal values that define individ-
uals’ relationships with broader groups and help coordi-
nate behavior within them should matter most in
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determining foreign-policy beliefs. Values based purely on
individual needs, such as achievement or power, would
demonstrate less of an effect. In this view, values that serve
the most basic (or even base) needs of individuals — such
as individual status within a group or pleasure-seeking —
are the least likely to affect foreign-policy beliefs. Coveting
status, positions of leadership, and respect will not neces-
sarily translate into support for military superiority, for in-
stance, since the latter concerns the actions of one’s
group rather than oneself.
Lying between self-transcendence and self-enhancement
(and directly across from conservation) in Schwartz’s cir-
cumplex are “openness” values such as self-direction and
stimulation. To explain this positioning, consider that self-
direction is a value that justifies the pursuit of selfish inter-
ests. However, as a general principle applied to others it
indicates a belief that all individuals should pursue their
own conception of the good life. It is indicative of a proso-
cial, universalist approach to individuals that emerges from
the Enlightenment, in which all humans are thought to
have intrinsic worth.
Openness likely helps individuals expand in-group
boundaries or at least venture beyond them. It allows indi-
viduals to look for mutually beneficial cooperation outside
of one’s immediate circle. Those who do so have been
found to do better than those who confine their relations
to those who are just like them (Yamagishi and Yamagishi
1994, 141; Messick and Kramer 2001; Rathbun 2012;
Orbell and Dawes 1993; Orbell et al. 1984). We expect
therefore that openness values will be predictive of coop-
erative internationalism. To the extent that openness val-
ues, which celebrate individuals, are directly opposed to
conservation values, they should also lead to higher sup-
port for militant internationalism.
Scholars have had considerable difficulties identifying
the individual-level attributes that consistently account for
variation in isolationism. For instance, while liberalism is
associated with higher levels of cooperative international-
ism and lower levels of militant internationalism, political
ideology explains little of the variance in this general de-
sire for disengagement from the world. One might argue
that we could disregard the dispositional causes of isola-
tionism. In contemporary studies of the structure of for-
eign policy attitudes, it is always the weakest dimension,
captured in statistical terms by a lower eigenvalue than
the other two foreign policy orientations (e.g., Rathbun
2007, 100). Research also shows that it likely has strong sit-
uational determinants, whether changes in the White
House (Urbatsch 2010), the economy (Fordham 2008), or
the world stage (Kertzer 2013). However, we argue that
even while isolationism might not be as much a disposi-
tional phenomenon as other foreign policy postures, val-
ues might still help us understand why some are inclined
toward removing their countries from the world.
We propose that isolationism is partially driven by a
sense of threat and is a different strategy for creating secu-
rity. Rather than preparing to fight so as to deter negative
outcomes, isolationists might simply prefer flight to re-
move themselves from dangerous situations through self-
sufficiency and non-involvement. Exemplified by what
Mead (2002) calls the “Jeffersonian” tradition in US for-
eign policy, this strand of isolationism should therefore be
associated with high levels of conservation and low levels
of universalism. Indeed historically isolationism has been
highly nationalistic, even chauvinistic in character and
hostile to liberal schemes for multilateral order (Dueck
2006). At the same time, that desire for self-sufficiency
likely makes isolationists feel less of a bond with their fel-
low countrymen, which would be expressed in higher
scores on self-enhancement and lower scores on
benevolence.
Hypotheses
Based on the previous discussion, we hypothesize a rela-
tively simple and elegant structure of foreign-policy beliefs
and personal values. Since it is generally accepted that for-
eign policy postures help people derive more specific pol-
icy attitudes (e.g., Reifler et al. 2011), our interest is
higher up in the vertical chain: the effect of Schwartz’s
constructs on three foreign policy orientations.1
Our most important hypotheses are H1 and H2, as we
expect the largest impact for those two core sets of values
that are the basis of multiple two-dimensional models:
H1: Universalism will be positively related and highly predictive
of cooperative internationalism.
H2: Conservation will be positively related and highly predictive
of militant internationalism.
While we also expect universalism to be negatively asso-
ciated with militant internationalism and conservation to
be negatively associated with cooperative internationalism,
we believe that effects of these values will be more attenu-
ated given the primary purposes they serve.
As concerns self-enhancement values, we have two dif-
ferent hypotheses:
H3: If self-enhancement values are directly opposed to univer-
salist values, they will have the opposite effect of universalism,
leading to lower cooperative internationalism and higher militant
internationalism.
H4: If self-enhancement values are oblique or orthogonal to uni-
versalist values, conservation and self-transcendence values (par-
ticularly universalism), self-enhancement values will not have
much effect on foreign policy attitudes.
As for openness, we predict,
H5: Openness will be associated with greater cooperative inter-
nationalism and lower militant internationalism.
We also have two different expectations for
isolationism.
H6: Isolationism will be associated with higher levels of conser-
vation and lower levels of universalism.
H7: Isolationism will be associated with high levels of self-en-
hancement and low levels of benevolence.
Data and Results
The CVP Survey, Personal Values, Rival Independent
Variables, and Controls
In late January 2011, a nationally representative sample of
1,200 American adults was given the “Core Values Project”
(CVP) survey, which we believe is the most comprehensive
1One line of critique, which we do not explore here, concerns the restric-
tive top-down nature of hierarchical models. See Kertzer and Powers (2014).
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survey to date on personal values, foreign policy outlooks,
and political attitudes. The survey, fielded by YouGov/
Polimetrix, was specifically designed to test the claims pre-
sented in this paper that values structure foreign policy
thinking. Our empirical strategy is straightforward: we
measure the underlying trans-situational values people
hold, and use them to explain foreign policy outlooks
while controlling for other variables.
We utilize the cooperative/militant internationalism
framework, supplemented by isolationist measures, as a
large and well-established body of research has repeatedly
found that it accounts for the overall structure of the for-
eign-policy beliefs of Americans, even across epochs
(Murray 1996). Moreover, the evidence of coherent atti-
tudes does not seem to be unique to the American con-
text: scholars have also found evidence of a similar
structure of foreign-policy beliefs in at least Sweden,
Canada, and Great Britain (Bjereld and Ekengren 1999;
Reifler et al. 2011). We therefore measure our dependent
variables of interest — participants’ foreign policy orienta-
tions rather than specific issue attitudes — by asking par-
ticipants about the extent to which they agree or disagree
with a series of 10 statements, each of which taps into one
of these three classic orientations from the foreign-policy
beliefs literature (e.g. Rathbun 2007; Wittkopf 1990;
Holsti and Rosenau 1988, 1990; Kertzer et al. 2014). Four
of the items measure militant internationalism (sample
item: “The United States must demonstrate its resolve so
that others do not take advantage of it”), four capture co-
operative internationalism (sample item: “The United
States needs to cooperate more with the United
Nations”), and two reflect support for isolationism (sam-
ple item: “The U.S. should mind its own business
internationally and let other countries get along the best
they can on their own.”)
As would be expected given the popularity of these three
sets of measures, a variety of factor analytic techniques
point to the presence of three distinct factors. Parallel anal-
ysis (Zwick and Velicer 1986) recommends a three factor
solution. Exploratory factor analysis with principal axis fac-
toring and varimax rotation shows that the three factors
correspond to the militant internationalism, cooperative in-
ternationalism, and isolationism scales (see Appendix §4.1
for the pattern matrix), and produces a good fit according
to standard model fit criteria (RMSEA: 0.042, RMSEA.LB:
0.03, TLI: 0.967 — see Preacher et al. 2013). In the main
analysis below, we employ factor scores for these scales to
obtain more precise estimates of our constructs of interest;
in the appendix we replicate the analysis using simpler ad-
ditive scores and find the results hold.
To measure our independent variables of interest —
participants’ personal values — we employ a 20-item ver-
sion of the Schwartz Portrait Value Questionnaire (PVQ)
in which respondents are presented with verbal “portraits”
of individuals (sample item for universalism: “She thinks
it is important that every person in the world should be
treated equally. She believes everyone should have equal
opportunities in life.”) gender-matched with each respon-
dent, and asked to indicate “how much each person is or
is not like you” (see Appendix §2 for the full instrumenta-
tion). We use a shorter 20-item version of the Schwartz
value scale based on the ESS-PVQ-21 employed on the
European Social Survey rather than the longer 40-item
version, which is less practical to field on nationally repre-
sentative samples because of cost considerations (for its
measurement properties, see Davidov et al. 2008). As is
Table 1. Value underpinnings of foreign policy orientations (I)
Militant internationalism Cooperative internationalism Isolationism
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Conservation 0.061** 0.056** 0.015** 0.016** 0.016** 0.013**
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006)
Openness 0.014* 0.015** 0.010 0.008 0.015* 0.013*
(0.008) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008)
Self-enhancement 0.005 0.010* 0.006 0.008 0.002 0.005
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Self-transcendence 0.040** 0.037** 0.095** 0.095** 0.014 0.014
(0.009) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.009) (0.009)
Male 0.030** 0.008 0.023**
(0.010) (0.010) (0.011)
Age (logged) 0.123** 0.038** 0.010
(0.015) (0.015) (0.016)
White 0.055** 0.002 0.008
(0.011) (0.011) (0.012)
High school 0.029 0.007 0.004
(0.026) (0.026) (0.028)
Some college 0.004 0.044 0.018
(0.027) (0.027) (0.029)
College/university 0.029 0.043 0.008
(0.027) (0.027) (0.029)
Graduate/professional 0.065** 0.005 0.061*
(0.029) (0.029) (0.032)
Constant 0.469** 0.056 0.347** 0.530** 0.427** 0.410**
(0.027) (0.068) (0.026) (0.069) (0.028) (0.075)
N 955 955 955 955 955 955
Adjusted R2 0.129 0.226 0.148 0.160 0.014 0.029
Note: *p < .05, **p < .01. Models 1, 3 & 5 include survey weights. Schwartz values measured using additive scales, normalized to range from 0–1
for ease of interpretability.
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standard in this type of survey research, we also include
the usual demographic controls, measuring age, race, gen-
der, and so on. Importantly, the Schwartz items are far-
ther removed from the policy preferences they are
supposed to explain than many of the standard items em-
ployed by political scientists in surveys such as the
American National Election Studies (ANES) or General
Social Surveys (GSS).
Personal Values Shape Foreign Policy Orientations
As an initial cut at the results, Table 1 presents a series of
regression models where we estimate the effect of per-
sonal values on foreign policy orientations by aggregating
upwards and employing additive scores for each of
Schwartz’s four superordinate value categories (conserva-
tion: a ¼ 0.77, openness to change: a ¼ 0.74, self-enhance-
ment: a ¼ 0.84, self-transcendence: a ¼ 0.77). Models 1, 3,
and 5 include survey weights, while models 2, 4, and 6 in-
clude a series of demographic control variables, although
both sets of results tell a substantively similar story, sug-
gesting four findings in particular.
First, self-enhancement values, devoted to the meeting
of personal needs, never significantly predict foreign pol-
icy orientations, while interpersonal values — particularly
conservation and self-transcendence — play a larger role.
Thus, as anticipated given the sociotropic nature of for-
eign policy preferences, interpersonal values more
strongly predict foreign policy orientations than personal
ones. Openness also adds little. Second, conservation val-
ues are statistically significant predictors of support for
militant internationalism: individuals who embrace values
that emphasize group survival like conformity, tradition,
and security are the most supportive of the United States
employing tough, coercive means of foreign policy
abroad. Third, self-transcendence strongly predicts sup-
port for cooperative internationalism: respondents who
seek to promote the welfare of others endorse foreign pol-
icies that do the same. Fourth, in comparison with mili-
tant and cooperative internationalism, isolationism
appears to be less rooted in personal values. There is
some support for H6: conservation’s effect is statistically
significant, but substantively weak, and even combined,
the values explain relatively little of the variation in isola-
tionist views, echoing other research highlighting the diffi-
culties of rooting isolationism in personal values (Kertzer
et al. 2014).
However, there are several reasons to be cautious about
these results: although parsimonious, restricting our focus
to the four superordinate value categories may mask po-
tential heterogeneity, belying the possibility that values
that occupy a similar structural position within Schwartz’s
framework have distinct effects on foreign policy postures.
For example, as mentioned above, both universalism and
benevolence are self-transcendence values, yet since uni-
versalism involves promoting the welfare of all while be-
nevolence involves taking care of your friends, we would
expect cooperative internationalism to be more strongly
predicted by the former than the latter. Testing this hy-
pothesis thus requires a lower level of aggregation.
Moreover, the use of additive scales tacitly assumes that
each indicator contributes equally to a participant’s score,
when certain questions may more closely proxy the under-
lying construct being measured than others.
To obtain a more precise measure of our quantities of
interest and strike a balance between parsimony and em-
pirical richness, we used principal axis factoring with
varimax rotation to generate factor scores from a six fac-
tor solution, in which two of the factors correspond to su-
perordinate value categories discussed above
(conservation and openness to change), and the remain-
ing factors refer to the two self-transcendence values (uni-
versalism and benevolence), and two self-enhancement
values (achievement and power). We present the pattern
matrix and more details about the model selection proce-
dure in Appendix §4.2, but four points are worth noting
here: the six factor solution has a good model fit
(RMSEA: 0.043, RMSEA.LB: 0.037, TLI¼0.951), is theoret-
ically interpretable, and avoids the multicollinearity con-
cerns that would result from including additive scales for
all 10 Schwartz values in a regression model simulta-
neously, all while obtaining more precise measures of our
quantities of interest than would be possible from simple
additive scales. Table 2 replicates the models from Table
1, this time using the factor score measures of the
Schwartz values; the coefficient plot in the top panel of
Figure 2 visually depicts the quantities of interest.
The top panel of Figure 2 presents a set of coefficient
plots from a series of regression models regressing foreign
policy orientations on the Schwartz values, while the bot-
tom panel follows Ward et al. (2010) by presenting the
same results another way, comparing each variable’s statis-
tical significance (jzj) and contribution to the model’s
insample predictive power (DR2). Both sets of plots recon-
firm that universalism is the driving value behind coopera-
tive internationalism, that conservation (and to a lesser
extent, universalism) underpin militant internationalism,
and that the Schwartz values have little impact on
isolationism.
Many of the patterns we saw in Table 1 also manifest
themselves in Table 2: conservation, for example, is
strongly positively associated with support for militant in-
ternationalism. At the same time, however, several dynam-
ics change. The effect sizes are consistently larger than
their predecessors in the previous set of models.
Moreover, by disaggregating the self-transcendence values,
we see that universalism and benevolence indeed have
very different effects. As expected, it is the former rather
than the latter that is strongly predictive of cooperative in-
ternationalism; although less statistically significant, be-
nevolence appears to be negatively associated with
cooperative internationalism, consistent with previous re-
search that shows that in-group loyalty decreases support
for humanitarianism abroad (Kertzer et al. 2014).
Benevolence is also positively associated with support for
militant internationalism, as we would expect if its effect
is to facilitate in-group solidarity based on our theoretical
review above, although displaying a substantively smaller
effect than conservation.
As we expected in H3, if self-enhancement values were
not directly opposed to self-transcendence values, they
have no real effect, statistical or substantive, on foreign
policy postures, with the exception of power’s slight nega-
tive effect on cooperative internationalism. We find some
support for H5: openness is associated with higher coop-
erative internationalism, although not with lower militant
internationalism. We expected the latter if openness was
not orthogonal to conservation, as indicated by the two
value sets forming separate dimensions in the factor
analysis.
Finally, we find some support for both H6 and H7.
Isolationism is indeed associated with higher levels of con-
servation, consistent with the idea that conservation values
are a way of meeting threats, and that isolationism is a
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particular way of protecting one’s country. And yet, isola-
tionists do not have the same communal solidarity as
others who embrace conservation values; they score lower
on benevolence. In this way, isolationists have a different
value combination than either cooperative international-
ists or militant internationalists. With the militant interna-
tionalists, they share conservation values, consistent with
the idea that both fight and flight are the responses we ex-
pect in situations of threat, toward which conservation val-
ues are oriented. However, they do not have the same
sense of communal solidarity expressed through benevo-
lence values. Isolationism is about self-sufficiency and re-
moving oneself from others.
Values are therefore helpful in resolving a longstanding
puzzle in the literature on foreign policy attitudes.
Wittkopf (1990) and Holsti and Rosenau (1988, 1990)
conceptualize isolationism as a combination of low inter-
nationalism, both militant and cooperative. Yet it often ap-
pears as a separate dimension in factor analyses of survey
data, as it does here. That suggests that isolationism is
more than just the absence of other foreign policy orien-
tations. Our data offer a helpful step in understanding
this: isolationism is a different construct because its adher-
ents have a different constellation of values than interna-
tionalists of either type. Nevertheless, we do note that
values are a weaker determinant of isolationism than
other foreign policy postures, consistent with the idea that
the question of whether to engage with the international
system has stronger external determinants than the ques-
tion of how.
Since, as Ward et al. (2010) show, statistical significance
does not necessarily lead to predictive power, we illustrate
these results another way in the bottom panel of Figure 2,
which replicates the regression results presented in
Table 2, but this time plotting the effects of each of the
personal values as a function of its statistical significance
(on the x axis, represented here as the absolute value of
its z statistic), and the change in in-sample predictive
power (on the y axis, represented here by the change in
the R2 statistic) incurred by dropping the personal value
from the model. These results reconfirm the intuitions
from the previous sets of results: universalism is the driv-
ing value behind cooperative internationalism (explaining
almost 20% of the variance), while conservation — and to
a lesser extent, universalism — underpin militant interna-
tionalism, and the Schwartz values have relatively little im-
pact on isolationism. The substantive effects of
universalism on cooperative internationalism and conser-
vation on militant internationalism are substantively large:
holding all other variables at their means, a change from
the 5th to the 95th percentile in universalism is associated
with a change from the 17th to the 70th percentile in co-
operative internationalism, while a change from the 5th
to the 95th percentile in conservation is associated with a
change from the 29th to the 67th percentile in militant
internationalism.
Table 2. Value underpinnings of foreign policy orientations (II)
Militant internationalism Cooperative internationalism Isolationism
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Conservation 0.317** 0.302** 0.001 0.0001 0.104** 0.087**
(0.028) (0.028) (0.026) (0.028) (0.030) (0.031)
Openness 0.019 0.060** 0.093** 0.086** 0.037 0.039
(0.028) (0.027) (0.026) (0.027) (0.030) (0.030)
Achievement 0.019 0.077** 0.045 0.040 0.037 0.043
(0.029) (0.028) (0.027) (0.028) (0.031) (0.032)
Power 0.010 0.036 0.094** 0.095** 0.004 0.016
(0.032) (0.031) (0.031) (0.031) (0.034) (0.035)
Universalism 0.242** 0.197** 0.430** 0.423** 0.015 0.014
(0.030) (0.029) (0.028) (0.029) (0.032) (0.032)
Benevolence 0.198** 0.143** 0.063* 0.060* 0.077** 0.088**
(0.035) (0.034) (0.033) (0.034) (0.037) (0.038)
Male 0.030** 0.004 0.021*
(0.010) (0.010) (0.011)
Age (logged) 0.114** 0.022 0.014
(0.015) (0.015) (0.017)
White 0.045** 0.010 0.010
(0.011) (0.011) (0.012)
High school 0.026 0.009 0.0004
(0.025) (0.025) (0.028)
Some college 0.010 0.033 0.017
(0.026) (0.026) (0.029)
College/university 0.029 0.035 0.009
(0.026) (0.026) (0.029)
Graduate/professional 0.068** 0.014 0.062**
(0.028) (0.028) (0.032)
Constant 0.431** 0.069 0.338** 0.445** 0.434** 0.397**
(0.037) (0.073) (0.035) (0.073) (0.039) (0.082)
N 958 958 958 958 958 958
Adjusted R2 0.190 0.265 0.214 0.219 0.014 0.029
Note: *p < .05, **p < .01, Models 1, 3 & 5 include survey weights. Schwartz values measured using factor scales, normalized to range from 0-1 for
ease of interpretability.
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Nonparametric Mediation Analysis: Do Personal Values Shape
Foreign Policy Preferences Even Amongst the Politically
Unsophisticated?
To summarize, we have shown that personal values —
especially those serving interpersonal goals — shape for-
eign policy orientations: Americans who place a great deal
of emphasis on promoting the welfare of others are more
likely to be cooperative internationalists favoring working
through the United Nations to resolve global problems,
while respondents who are heavily concerned with the sta-
bility and security of the in-group are more likely to be
militant internationalists favoring the use of force abroad.
Americans, in other words, take foreign policy personally.
Both the cooperative/militant internationalism and the
vertical constraint models challenge the pessimism of early
studies of American public opinion that found the mass
public incapable of forming coherent beliefs about foreign
policy, largely because they could not connect attitudes
about international relations with their political ideology.
Despite consistent findings that foreign policy attitudes are
structured, this idea persists, most recently in the form of
“elite cue” theory in which the mass public is viewed as pas-
sively receiving the wisdom of elites and the media.
Goren (2013) challenges this pessimistic view of voter
competence, showing that even while low-information vot-
ers who do not follow politics closely have a hard time
identifying what a conservative or a liberal position is, they
can nevertheless form coherent beliefs based on core val-
ues. He shows that values demonstrate a similar effect on
policy attitudes of both low and high knowledge respon-
dents but that in the case of the latter those views are
more highly mediated by political ideology.
We therefore turn to nonparametric mediation analysis
(Imai et al. 2011), estimating a set of nonparametric medi-
ation models in which the effects of personal values are
mediated by political ideology. Doing so not only serves as
a means of mapping the ideological pathways through
which personal values structure foreign-policy beliefs, but
also offers a way to study the role of political ideology
without inducing post-treatment bias (King and Zeng
2007): if personal values are truly pre-political, estimating
their effects on foreign policy preferences while control-
ling for ideology would bias our effect estimates. We esti-
mate separate mediation models for high- and low-
knowledge participants, based on how they performed on
a political knowledge test in our survey.2 If the public is
truly as helpless as pessimistic readings of elite cue theory
would suggest, low-knowledge respondents should have
difficulty connecting their values to their foreign policy
orientations; they should need information from trusted
elites in order to structure their foreign policy preferences
for them, to provide the “constraint” from above that is
unavailable from below. If, in contrast, even low-knowl-
edge individuals are capable of grounding their foreign
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Figure 2. Personal values predict foreign policy orientations
2The parallel analyses are thus akin to a moderated mediation model, in
which the indirect effect of core values on foreign policy orientations through
political ideology is moderated by political knowledge. On moderated media-
tion, see Preacher, Rucker, and Hayes 2007.
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policy orientations in their core values, we should see the
total effects of core values not significantly varying across
both subgroups, even if the indirect effects through ideol-
ogy differ. Low-knowledge individuals may indeed be as
“innocent of ideology” as Converse (1964) claims, and will
thus display weaker indirect effects, but the total effects
will remain the same across both subgroups, as even unso-
phisticated respondents can anchor their foreign-policy
beliefs on their core values, despite the absence of elite
cues from above. Given the complexity of the model —
with six treatments and three dependent variables — in
order to save space we relegate the full set of results to
Appendix §6, and focus our attention here on the effects
of conservation and universalism, the two Schwartz values
that are not only of the most theoretical interest, but also
played the most important role in the previous analyses.
Figure 3 plots three quantities of interest for each per-
sonal value. First is the average causal mediation effect
(ACME), which refers to each personal value’s effect on
foreign policy orientations transmitted through political
ideology. Second is the direct effect, which refers to the
personal value’s effect on foreign policy postures chan-
neled through all other potential mechanisms; in supple-
mentary analyses in Appendix §6, we estimate a set of
multiple mediation models to test whether ethnocentrism
and the morality of force, the two foreign policy values es-
poused by Hurwitz and Peffley (1987), play a role here, al-
though we focus on the role of ideology in our main
analysis. Third is the total effect of the personal value on
foreign policy orientation, regardless of the mechanism.
Figure 3 presents selected results from a pair of non-
parametric mediation models (Imai et al. 2011) calculated
using N¼ 1500 simulations and 95% quasi-Bayesian confi-
dence intervals, in which personal values’ effects on for-
eign policy orientations is mediated through political
ideology. The results for low-knowledge respondents are
shown in grey, and high-knowledge ones in black.
Importantly, although the ACMEs differ — a greater pro-
portion of the total effect is mediated by ideology for
higher-knowledge participants — the total effects do not.
We present just the results for the two most substantively
important personal values (conservation and universal-
ism) here; see Appendix §6 for the full set of results.
We median-split the sample on respondents’ levels of po-
litical knowledge, and estimate two sets of models: the point
estimates shown in black are from the high-knowledge sub-
sample, and the point estimates in grey are from the low-
knowledge one. Three points are important here. First,
although ideology’s mediation effects are significant for
our core values of interest, personal values continue to
matter independently of ideology for both groups of re-
spondents: in the high-knowledge subsample, for exam-
ple, only 36% of conservation’s effect on militant
internationalism is transmitted through political ideol-
ogy. We know that political ideology matters in foreign
policy (Gries 2014), but these results tell us that personal
values predict foreign policy postures above and beyond
the usual differences displayed by liberals and conserva-
tives.3 Second, the magnitude of the mediation effects is
systematically larger for high-knowledge participants
than for low-knowledge ones: the ACME for the effect of
universalism on cooperative internationalism is 0.16 in
the high-knowledge group (40% of the total effect), but
only 0.04 in the low-knowledge group (9% of the total ef-
fect). Similarly, the ACME for the effect of conservation
on militant internationalism is 0.11 in the high-knowl-
edge group (36% of the total effect), and only 0.04 in
the low-knowledge group (15% of the total effect).
Consistent with much of the public opinion literature,
then, high-knowledge respondents are more ideological
than low-knowledge ones. Yet the sizes of the total effects
do not significantly differ from one another: the total ef-
fect of universalism on cooperative internationalism is
0.43 in the low-knowledge group, and 0.40 in the high-
knowledge one; the total effect of conservation on mili-
tant internationalism is 0.27 in the low knowledge group,
and 0.31 in the high-knowledge one.
In other words, we find, as did Goren in other domains,
that values ground low-knowledge respondents’ foreign
policy dispositions just as they do for high-knowledge re-
spondents. The latter simply demonstrate a tighter link
between values, ideology and foreign policy postures.
Where we differ from other work, however, is that the val-
ues we use are horizontal in character; they transcend the
foreign policy domain.
Conclusion
Our findings suggest that personal values play a role in
how ordinary people make sense of world politics. Other
scholars of public opinion about foreign policy study the
role of values, but typically do so by looking at one-off ef-
fects of individual values rather than exploring how values
connect to a broader system. Although Schwartz’s theory
of universal values now constitutes a prominent and pro-
lific research agenda in political and social psychology, we
are, to our knowledge, the first to systematically investi-
gate the relationship between these personal values and
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Figure 3. Nonparametric mediation models: even low-knowledge respondents can anchor on core values. Low-knowledge
respondents in grey, high-knowledge in black
3See Appendix §6 for sensitivity analyses.
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foreign-policy orientations via a nationally representative
sample of Americans.
In general, our analysis shows that those values that de-
fine individuals’ relationships with broader groups—as well
as help coordinate behavior within them—play a larger
role in foreign-policy beliefs than values based purely on in-
dividual needs. Conservation values provide strong predic-
tors of militant internationalism. Universalism values are
strongly associated with cooperative internationalism. In
other words, the same fundamental values that shape our
beliefs and behavior in our daily lives also predict our for-
eign-policy preferences; people take foreign policy person-
ally. Values also help us better understand the
phenomenon of isolationism. Isolationists embrace a
unique combination of personal values: they are high on
conservation but low on benevolence. Like Hurwitz and
Peffley (1987), we claim that values and foreign policy ori-
entations are related at least largely in a vertical sense, with
the former driving the latter. However, personal values take
the form of abstract beliefs about desirable end states or be-
haviors that transcend specific situations. They can there-
fore guide evaluation and behavior across the water’s edge
and into the domain of foreign affairs.
Our study carries with it a number of important implica-
tions. First, the Schwartz value scheme is universal. It
encompasses multiple aspects of life, and works across cul-
tures and contexts. Because other research demonstrates
the significance of this same value framework for domestic
political issues (e.g., Caprara et al. 2006; Schwartz et al.
2010), our results offer further evidence that foreign-policy
beliefs reflect a universal value scheme. Our findings indi-
cate that personal values matter for the mass public on
those political issues and foreign-policy matters that they
are the most removed from. This reveals the power of
values.
Future research should explore similar linkages between
personal values and foreign-policy preferences in other
countries (e.g., Bayram 2015), and whether cross-national
variation in foreign-policy preferences can be traced to
cross-national variation in values as well. Typically in
International Relations we assume that shared values across
states promotes cooperation—as in, for example, liberal
theories of the democratic peace (Russett 1993), and re-
search on the role of ideological distance on conflict (Haas
2005) — but because conservation values serve the stability
and well-being of the in-group, it may turn out that com-
mon values also facilitate tensions and conflicts.
Second, and relatedly, when international-relations
scholars typically talk about values, they tend to employ
the kind of constructivist or ideational bent commonly as-
sociated with concepts such as legitimacy, socialization,
norms, and identity (Klotz 1995; Bukovansky 2007;
Finnemore 2009). The Schwartz values, however, are bio-
logically grounded. Each value cluster links to specific
needs to survive as organisms and individuals. In this
sense, there exists a “rump materialism” in the Schwartz
value scheme, which may offer a potential bridge between
public-opinion research and work examining the biologi-
cal underpinnings of conflict and decision-making (e.g.,
Hatemi and McDermott 2012).
Third, because the mass public is relatively uninformed
about events on the world stage, a large literature empha-
sizes the extent to which citizens use endorsements from
trusted elites as heuristics to shape their judgments
(Zaller 1992; Berinsky 2009). Yet personal values provide
another way for generally uninformed individuals to estab-
lish coherent foreign-policy preferences—even in absence
of elite cues. We show that those who score low on politi-
cal knowledge connect their personal values to their
foreign-policy orientations; they simply do so without go-
ing through the mediating factor of ideology—as high-
knowledge respondents do.
Fourth, our results suggest that while basic human values
structure foreign-policy beliefs, some values carry more
weight than others. This is where the distinction between
inter-personal or society-centered values (universalism and
conservation) and intra-personal or self-centered values
(self-enhancement values) becomes important. In the for-
eign-policy domain, public discourse centers on how to en-
sure national security and advance the national interest
abroad: Are military armaments or the tools of statecraft
better suited to advance American interests? Should the US
work through the UN or go it alone in international arena?
Given the sociotropic focus of issues like these, values that
prioritize socially-focused goals should find expression
more readily through policy opinions than those egocen-
tric values that prioritize personal advancement and self-
gratification. That is precisely what we found. We demon-
strated that socially orientated values of conservation and
universalism exert more consistent and powerful effects on
foreign-policy postures than the personally focused values
of achievement, power, and self-enhancement. In sum, stu-
dents of international relations and public opinion have
long seen values as prime candidates for shaping citizens’
views about foreign policy. We have affirmed this proposi-
tion, but with the critical qualification that some values are
more consequential than others.
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